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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ERIE COUNTY SHERIFF'S POLICE BENEVOLENT 
ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-42 67 
COUNTY OF ERIE and SHERIFF OF ERIE 
COUNTY, 
Joint Employer, 
-and-
TEAMSTERS, LOCAL 2 64, 
Intervenor. 
6LEAS0N, DUNN, WALSH & O'SHEA (RONALD 6. DUNN Of 
counsel), for Petitioner 
MICHAEL A. CONNORS, ESQ., for Joint Employer 
RONALD L. JAROS, ESQ., for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Erie County 
Sheriff's Police Benevolent Association (PBA) to a decision by 
the Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation 
(Director) on the PBA's petition to.fragment deputy sheriffs -
criminal from a unit of all Sheriff's department employees^7 of 
-'The existing unit includes employees in the titles of deputy 
sheriff - criminal, who are primarily responsible for law 
enforcement generally, and deputy sheriff - officer, who are 
primarily responsible for the care and custody of inmates, for 
security in the courts and other buildings or for civil 
functions. There are other employees in nondeputy positions who 
provide various administrative, clerical or medical support 
services. 
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the County of Erie and the Sheriff of Erie County (Joint 
Employer), which is currently represented by the Teamsters, 
Local 264 (Local 264). 
After a multi-day hearing, the Director dismissed the 
petition. Although viewing our decision in County of Dutchess 
and Dutchess County Sheriff-7 (hereafter Dutchess) to suggest 
the appropriateness of a separate unit for those deputy sheriffs 
who have general law enforcement duties, the Director read 
Dutchess to require the demonstration of a law enforcement • 
community of interest unique to the class of deputy sheriffs 
subject to the petition.-7 The Director concluded that he could 
not clearly differentiate the law enforcement duties of the 
deputy sheriffs - criminal from those of the deputy sheriffs -
officer, primarily due to the building security services provided 
by the latter group. He concluded that employees in both titles, 
all police officers under the Criminal Procedure Law (CPL), 
engage in the types of law enforcement work usually associated 
with the job of a police officer. As the PBA did not seek 
2/26 PERB 53069 (1993) . 
-
7After his decision in this case, the Director granted a 
petition to fragment road patrol deputy sheriffs from an existing 
sheriff's department unit in circumstances demonstrating a 
distinct law enforcement community of interest and in which the 
employer did not oppose the fragmentation. Orleans County and 
Orleans County Sheriff's Dep't. 29 PERB 54015 (1996). 
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fragmentation on any basis other than a unique law enforcement 
community of interest,-7 the Director dismissed the petition. 
The PBA argues in its exceptions that the deputy sheriffs -
criminal are the only police officers in the Sheriff's department 
who can be and are involved regularly in criminal law enforcement 
activities. The PBA interprets Dutchess to authorize and require 
separate units for those deputy sheriffs who are police officers 
appointed pursuant to examination for such position under the 
Civil Service Law (CSL). As the deputy sheriffs who are the 
subject of its petition are the only police officers appointed to 
a police officer position pursuant to civil service examination, 
and the only ones who can and do "routinely" perform criminal law 
enforcement duties, the PBA argues that the Director made a 
11
 fundamental error" in dismissing its petition. The PBA argues, 
moreover, that the Director disregarded or discounted other 
evidence establishing the unique police community of interest 
possessed by the deputy sheriffs - criminal, one not shared by 
any employees in the deputy sheriff - officer title series. 
The Joint Employer and Local 264 have opposed the petition 
throughout the representation proceedings and each argues that 
the Director's dismissal of the petition was correct on the law 
and facts. 
^Two petitions seeking fragmentation of the deputy sheriffs -
criminal on the basis of alleged conflict of interest and 
inadequate representation by Local 264 were dismissed in earlier 
proceedings. County of Erie and Erie County Sheriff, 25 PERB 
1[3062 (1992) and 22 PERB ^3055 (1989) . As noted, those claims 
are not repeated under this petition. 
Board - c-4267 -4 
The Joint Employer argues that it is not whether a deputy 
sheriff took a civil service police officer examination which is 
or should be dispositive of a fragmentation petition. It reads 
Dutchess to focus on the job duties performed by the deputy 
sheriffs and it argues that, as the Director recognized, there is 
a significant overlap in traditional law enforcement duties 
between those in the deputy sheriff - criminal title and those in 
the deputy sheriff - officer title. Urging restraint in the 
application of whatever "new" fragmentation standard there may be 
in Dutchess to avoid the overfragmentation of functioning units, 
the Joint Employer argues that the record fully warrants a 
continuation of the long-standing Sheriff's department unit. 
Local 264 echoes the Joint Employer's position that deputy 
sheriff - officers also perform traditional police work, most 
notably those deputies who are assigned to courthouse and other 
building security. Emphasizing also its belief that the duties 
performed are the focus of inquiry under Dutchess, Local 264 
argues that the admitted differences in the current 
qualifications and job training between deputy sheriff - officer 
and deputy sheriff - criminal should not be dispositive of the 
uniting question raised by the PBA's petition. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' 
arguments, including those at oral argument, we reverse the 
Director's decision and remand the case for further processing. 
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Until Dutchess, the Board's decisions involving petitions 
seeking to fragment existing units of deputy sheriffs were 
analyzed under fragmentation standards applicable to public 
employees generally. The decisions reflected the belief that all 
deputy sheriffs, regardless of title, qualifications, training or 
duties, share a community of interest based upon a commitment to 
law enforcement generally. Therefore, to warrant a fragmentation 
of a sheriff's department unit, there had to be shown, just as 
for other units, a compelling need to fragment, one usually based 
upon a demonstrated conflict of interest or a history of 
inadequate representation. As evidenced by the denial of the two 
earlier petitions to fragment these deputy sheriffs - criminal, 
such petitions were routinely denied.-7 
That general fragmentation standard, however, has never been 
applied in cases involving police officers of municipal police 
departments. As early as 1977, the Board, in City of 
Amsterdam-7 (hereafter Amsterdam), fragmented police officers 
from a unit which also included fire fighters despite the absence 
of any evidence demonstrating a conflict of interest or 
inadequate representation. The Board recognized then that police 
officers are "fundamentally different from everyone else" - even 
fire fighters who share the same statutory impasse procedures -
^In addition to the two cases involving this Joint Employer see 
County of Warren, 21 PERB 5[3037 (1988) ; County of Albany and 
Albany County Sheriff, 19 PERB ?[3054 (1986) and 15 PERB [^3008 
(1982); and County of Rockland. 11 PERB 53050 (1978). 
^10 PERB f3031 (1977). 
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"in ways that affect the essence of their labor relations".-7 
In further explaining in Amsterdam why the fragmentation of 
police officers was warranted, the Board observed that "the 
police service is concerned with the broad spectrum of human 
rights, public order, and the protection of life and 
property".-f It was, therefore, the police officers' 
responsibility for criminal law enforcement which persuaded the 
Board in Amsterdam of the appropriateness of a separate unit for 
such officers, even if the grant of a separate unit necessitated 
the fragmentation of an existing public safety unit. 
Dutchess involved a fragmentation petition grounded upon 
alleged inadequate representation of deputy sheriffs by the 
incumbent union. Although affirming the Director's determination 
that the ground asserted for fragmentation was not established, 
we remanded the petition to the Director for a further 
investigation, noting that there was little in the record 
regarding "the civil service classifications, distinct duties, 
responsibilities and working conditions of the deputy sheriffs 
and other employees of the Joint Employer".-7 We concluded upon 
"reconsideration of our fragmentation decisions regarding 
sheriff's department personnel", that "[t]he law enforcement 
duties of deputy sheriffs may justify a separate bargaining unit 
Z/Id. at 3 061. 
^Id., quoting W.F. Danielson, Personnel Report No. 64 (Public 
Personnel Ass'n). 
2/26 PERB 53069, at 3130. 
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for them based upon an arguable unique community of interest 
and/or actual or potential conflict of interest with other 
employees in the Sheriff's Department who may not have any 
similar duties.11—7 As Dutchess was settled after the remand, no 
subsequent decision was issued. This case, therefore, is our 
first opportunity to consider Dutchess after its release. 
The meaning of Dutchess can be ascertained from the remand 
itself and our reliance on Amsterdam. Dutchess at its simplest 
represents our realization that deputy sheriffs cannot reasonably 
be looked upon as a generic group without separate identities and 
interests. Within the ranks of sheriff's department personnel 
are often deputy sheriffs whose sole function is criminal law 
enforcement; other deputies who have law enforcement as their 
primary, albeit not exclusive, function; still other deputies who 
do not regularly carry out law enforcement functions but do so 
occasionally; and, lastly,ithose, whether or not deputed, who 
perform none of what may be fairly considered traditional law 
enforcement activities. Dutchess, moreover, is an expression of 
our willingness to treat the uniting of deputy sheriffs in the 
same manner we have always treated the uniting of other police 
officers. 
The real focus of the parties' debate and our own 
deliberation is not so much over the meaning of Dutchess as it is 
over its proper application. The argument is centered upon the 
Ifi'ld. 
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following question: Which of the deputy sheriffs, if any, should 
be fragmented? 
The PBA argues that Dutchess created a "bright line litmus 
test" for the fragmentation of deputy sheriffs from existing 
sheriffs' department units. According to the PBA, only those 
deputy sheriffs who have taken a police officer examination under 
the CSL should be fragmented as of right from an existing 
departmental unit because only those deputies can or do perform a 
full range of criminal law enforcement activities. 
As much as we might like such a bright line test for ease of 
application, we must conclude that there was no such test 
articulated in Dutchess. Nor do we believe that the test the PBA 
proposes for our reaffirmation or adoption here is feasible. 
Police officers who have been appointed to their position 
pursuant to a civil service examination can and do regularly 
perform criminal law enforcement duties. That is alleged by the 
PBA, clearly established by the record, and admitted by the Joint 
Employer and Local 2 64. We see no difference between this class 
of deputy sheriff and any municipal police officer which would 
have any relevance to a unit determination. However, simply 
because CSL deputy sheriffs are engaged in criminal law 
enforcement does not mean that other deputy sheriffs are not and 
cannot be so engaged. All deputy sheriffs in counties outside 
New York City, including the deputy sheriff - criminal and deputy 
sheriff - officer titles in this case, are police officers under 
the CPL and it is that law, in the main, which defines their 
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police powers. Moreover, as the Director found, and as the 
record again establishes, some employees in the deputy sheriff -
officer title can and do engage in limited criminal law 
enforcement activities from time to time. From this, it should 
be readily apparent that any fragmentation to be ordered cannot 
be based reasonably simply upon a job title or a method of 
appointment. 
Our rejection of the PBA's proposed "test" does not mean, 
however, that the CSL is immaterial to our analysis. To the 
contrary, the definition of police officer in CSL §58(3), with 
one additional condition, defines the class of deputy sheriff 
that we considered for possible fragmentation from an existing 
sheriff's department unit under Dutchess. As defined in the CSL, 
a police officer is one who is "responsible for the prevention 
and detection of crime and the enforcement of the general 
criminal laws of the state". To that basic CSL definition, we 
add a requirement for purposes of determining the most 
appropriate unit under the Act that those duties as defined be 
the exclusive or primary characteristic of the deputy sheriff 
position. It is only that class of deputy sheriff which we 
believe is concerned with, in the words of Amsterdam, "the broad 
spectrum of human rights, public order and the protection of life 
and property". 
In this case, only those employees in the deputy sheriff -
criminal title series meet that standard. Although deputy 
sheriff - officers do perform criminal law enforcement duties on 
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a limited basis from time to time, all employees in the deputy 
sheriff - officer title have as the primary characteristic of 
their employment either responsibility for building security, the 
care and custody of inmates, or the service of civil process and 
other civil functions. Deputy sheriff - officers are not, for 
purposes relevant to statutory uniting,—7 engaged exclusively 
or primarily in the prevention and detection of crime and the 
enforcement of the general criminal laws of the State.—7 
The "line blurring" emphasized by the Director as the basis 
for the denial of this petition was premised upon the deputy 
sheriff - officers' occasional involvement in criminal law 
enforcement pursuant to their police officer status and powers 
under the CPL. But the occasional performance of criminal law 
enforcement duties by some deputy sheriff - officers is no basis 
to fragment them from the existing unit nor can it be used to 
deny fragmentation to the deputy sheriffs - criminal who are or 
can be regularly exposed to that type of law enforcement by 
virtue of their status, qualifications and required training. 
•H'We express no opinion as to whether any deputy sheriffs -
officer can be considered to be engaged in criminal law 
enforcement to any degree for any other purpose. Those are 
issues not within our jurisdiction and the answer to the question 
would depend upon factors other than the uniting criteria in the 
Act as applied. 
—
7In Orleans County and Orleans County Sheriff's Dep't, supra, 
note 2, the Director stated that "court security or similar 
duties . . . fall within the rubric of 'law enforcement"1. We do 
not agree with this statement to the extent it is inconsistent 
with our decision in this case. 
Board - C-42 67 -11 
We realize, of course, as the Joint Employer points out in 
its brief, that even within the deputy sheriff - criminal title 
series, the degree of involvement with criminal law enforcement 
activities will vary by individual according to their area of 
assignment at any given time. That circumstance is equally true, 
however, among the police officer members of municipal police 
departments. The uniting standard articulated in this case 
produces a unit which we consider to be entirely in keeping with 
our prevailing practice regarding all other police officers. The 
unit we fashion consists of those in the police services division 
of the sheriff's department and includes road patrol officers, 
detectives, supervisory personnel, and others providing ancillary 
services which are directly and predominantly related to criminal 
law enforcement. These deputy sheriffs - criminal alone share 
the community of interest growing out of the qualifications, 
training and duties unique to a police officer who is responsible 
for the prevention and detection of crime under the general 
criminal laws of the State. 
The fundamental differences between those deputy sheriffs 
whose predominant duties are in criminal law enforcement and all 
other deputies is shown throughout the record and in the 
uncontested findings made by the Director, which warrant no 
repetition here. These are differences acknowledged by the 
Sheriff, reflected in the rules and regulations of the 
department, and emphasized in separate career ladders, and 
significantly different job qualifications, job descriptions and 
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training requirements, which are again described in detail in the 
Director's decision. Even though many of these subjects would be 
beyond the scope of compulsory negotiation, they underscore the 
differences between the two basic deputy titles and confirm that 
it is only the deputy sheriff - criminal who has and can have 
criminal law enforcement as the exclusive or primary attribute of 
his or her employment. The deputy sheriff - officers are simply 
not qualified, and are not expected by this Joint Employer to be 
qualified, whether by education, training or otherwise, to 
perform the full range of law enforcement work which all deputy 
sheriffs - criminal are qualified to do. 
Only two additional issues raised by the Joint Employer and 
Local 2 64 remain for discussion. 
In Amsterdam, the Board held that the City's administrative 
convenience, as articulated by its mayor, but contrary to the 
position articulated by its legislative body, favored 
fragmentation of the police officers from the existing unit. The 
Joint Employer in this case has consistently articulated its 
opposition to the fragmentation of the deputy sheriffs -
criminal, maintaining that it will destroy years of planning 
designed to maximize the utilization of personnel. 
Although administrative convenience is a factor to be 
considered in making a unit determination, it is not dispositive. 
We are unable to discern anything in the fragmentation of the 
deputy sheriff - criminal title series from the existing unit 
which would necessarily produce the effects envisioned by the 
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Joint Employer. The mere possibility, even likelihood, that 
there will be some labor relations or personnel issues created as 
a result of the fragmentation of the deputy sheriffs - criminal 
is not a reason to deny them what is otherwise clearly the most 
appropriate unit in view of the "strong prevailing practice of 
having separate units for policemen".—/ 
We are also mindful of both the Joint Employer's and 
Local 2 64's argument that any fragmentation ordered in this case 
cannot be confined logically to deputy sheriff personnel and will 
lead inexorably to similar requests by any other employees who 
can reasonably claim some unique community of interest. We will 
decide such issues as appropriate should they arise in the 
future. However, nothing in this decision is intended to hold or 
suggest that we are abandoning our fragmentation standards 
generally. By this decision, we are simply giving effect to a 
uniting principle first articulated almost twenty years ago which 
is confined in its implications to police officers who are 
"fundamentally different from everyone else." If we afford to 
municipal police officers units separate from all other 
employees, we cannot do differently for those deputy sheriffs who 
are identically situated to those police officers in all relevant 
respects. 
For the reasons set forth above, we find the following unit 
to be most appropriate: 
—Amsterdam, supra, at 3062. 
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Included: Full-time employees of the Joint Employer in the 
following titles: deputy sheriff - criminal; 
deputy sheriff - criminal (Spanish speaking); 
deputy sheriff - criminal (Seneca speaking); 
undercover narcotics deputy; detective deputy; 
detective deputy arson; technical sergeant; 
sergeant - criminal; training director; senior 
detective narcotics; coordinator - domestic 
violence; lieutenant - criminal; captain -
criminal. 
Excluded: All other employees of the Joint Employer 
The unit we have defined as most appropriate may or may not 
include those deputy sheriffs who constitute the so-called "Rath 
Patrol11.—7' These are deputy sheriffs who provide a police 
presence at social services buildings in Erie County. These 
officers were ordered reclassified and were made members of the 
Joint Employer's Criminal Division by decision of the Appellate 
Division, Fourth Department.—7 We are unclear, however, 
whether and to what extent the Rath Patrol deputies are criminal 
deputies and, more importantly, whether they have the 
qualifications and training which would permit them to be 
assigned the general law enforcement duties of a deputy sheriff -
criminal. If they are fully qualified and empowered to perform 
criminal law enforcement duties, then their assignment to a 
building security detail would not warrant their exclusion from 
the unit. As the present record does not afford us a basis to 
make an informed judgment regarding the uniting of the Rath 
—'The Director did not address this issue because he dismissed 
the petition. 
^
7Ryan v. Slisz. 206 A.D.2d 877 (4th Dep't 1994). 
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Patrol, the case is remanded to the Director for investigation 
and decision, as necessary, on that limited issue. 
The case is hereby remanded to the Director for further 
processing consistent with the terms of this decision. SO 
ORDERED. 
DATED: June 19, 1996 
Albany, New York 
Pauline" R. Kinsella, < Chairperson 
STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SUZANNE NOVAK, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-15686 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Respondent. 
ROBERT E. KUHN, for Charging Party 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (MARILYN S. DYMOND of 
counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on exceptions filed by Suzanne Novak 
to a decision by the Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Director) dismissing, as deficient, her charge 
against the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc. (CSEA). 
The charge alleges that CSEA breached its duty of fair 
representation in violation of §209-a.2(c) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) by refusing, to pursue to 
step III a grievance alleging a violation of Article 22.2 of the 
contract between CSEA and her employer, the State of New York 
(Office for the Aging) and by "apparently never" pursuing an out-
of-title work grievance under Article 24 of that contract and by 
not responding to her inquiries regarding that second grievance. 
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The Director notified Novak that her charge was deficient in 
most respects. Novak amended the charge in response to that 
notice of deficiency. The Director processed the charge as 
amended only as to CSEA's alleged failure to respond to inquiries 
about the out-of-title work grievance because he determined that 
the other allegations remained deficient. At a hearing on 
December 7, 1995, Novak withdrew the one aspect of her charge 
which was being processed, but she reiterated her objection to 
the Director's determination that the other aspects of her charge 
did not set forth a violation of the Act and she requested a 
decision regarding that deficiency determination. 
The Director dismissed the charge pertaining to the 
Article 22.2 grievance because there were no allegations which 
would evidence that the decision not to appeal from the step II 
grievance determination was arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad 
faith. The decision not to appeal was made by CSEA's Assistant 
Contract Administrator because she determined that "management's 
error" regarding a "departmental promotion", which was rescinded 
pursuant to a decision by the Civil Service Commission not to 
reclassify Novak's position, was not a "violation of the union 
contract". 
The charge pertaining to the Article 24 grievance was 
dismissed by the Director because there were no facts alleged in 
the charge as filed or as amended which would show that the 
grievance was "apparently never pursued". No exceptions have 
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been filed to the Director's dismissal of the allegations in this 
respect. 
Novak argues in her exceptions that she was not informed as 
to the nature of the deficiencies in her charge; that she was led 
to believe that she would be able to argue the deficiencies at 
the December 7, 1995 hearing before "the full board"; that she 
was prevented from amending her charge due to PERB's "lack of 
response" and that CSEA was required under the Act to appeal the 
Article 22.2 grievance. 
CSEA argues in response that the Director's decision is 
correct and should be affirmed. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the Director's decision. 
Novak's first three cited exceptions concern allegations of 
case processing errors committed by PERB staff. The record, 
however, contains no evidence in support of those allegations; to 
the contrary, it refutes them. Novak's attorney of record was 
informed by letter dated June 13, 1994, from the Assistant 
Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation 
(Assistant Director), as to the specific nature of the 
deficiencies in the charge as filed. Also, and again contrary to 
the allegations in the exceptions, Novak was permitted to file an 
amendment to the charge in response to the Assistant Director's 
notice of deficiency. As to the allegedly misleading conduct, 
nothing in the correspondence issued by agency staff to the 
parties or any comments made by the assigned Administrative Law 
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Judge (ALJ) at the hearing could have led Novak to believe that 
the noted deficiencies would be the subject of a hearing before 
us. The Assistant Director's August 2, 1994 letter to Novak's 
attorney states specifically that the charge "is being processed 
only as to the allegations . . . relating to CSEA's failure to 
provide information on Ms* Novak's Article 24 grievance". The 
limited extent to which the charge was being processed was 
reiterated by another letter, from the Assistant Director dated 
August 26, 1994, and in two letters from the assigned ALJ, the 
first dated December 29, 1994, and the second February 27, 1995. 
Other letters establish that Novak was fully aware of the 
Director's deficiency determinations, that she objected to them 
and that she expected a decision from the Director on the noted 
deficiencies. 
The sole substantive aspect of the exceptions concerns 
CSEA's decision not to appeal the Article 22.2 grievance. As 
alleged by Novak, Article 22.2 provides that a permanent employee 
will not suffer a reduction in salary as a result of a 
reclassification or reallocation of the employee's permanent 
position. Novak alleges that because her employer's action > 
adversely affected her, CSEA was statutorily reguired to appeal 
to step III of the grievance procedure as was promised by CSEA's 
step II representative. 
Novak's exceptions in this last regard reflect a 
misunderstanding regarding a union's duty of fair representation. 
A union does not have an absolute duty to appeal adverse 
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grievance determinations despite a grievant's demand.^ Nor 
does a union's duty of fair representation prevent it from 
evaluating the merits of a grievance appeal despite promises or 
assurances of such an appeal made earlier during the processing 
of the grievance, particularly when those promises or assurances 
are made by persons who are not responsible for the appellate 
determination.-7 Its statutory duty is to refrain from conduct 
which is arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith.-f 
The allegations in the charge evidence only that Novak's 
employer may have led her to believe that she was permanent in a 
higher position. The "promotion" Novak believes she had received 
from her employer was dependent upon a position reclassification 
by the Civil Service Commission, a reclassification which was 
denied. Actions were apparently taken by Novak's employer based 
upon assumptions which were not fulfilled because of the decision 
by the civil Service Commission denying a reclassification. 
CSEA's decision not to appeal the Article 22.2 grievance because 
it did not believe that the employer's acknowledged mistakes and 
errors violated the collective bargaining agreement is not one 
which can be considered arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad 
faith. As such, the Director was correct in dismissing this 
aspect of the charge. 
^Garvin v. PERB. 168 A.D.2d 446, 23 PERB [^7023 (2d Dep't 1990). 
g/Local 1655, Dist. Council 37. AFSCME, 25 PERB ^[3008 (1992) 
(reconsideration of grievance appeal permissible). 
^Public Employees Fed'n (Reese) , 29 PERB ^3027 (1996) . 
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For the reasons set forth above, the Director's decision is 
affirmed and the exceptions are denied. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: June 19, 1996 
Albany, New York 
u^ ine"5 R. TCinsella, Chai rperson 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES FEDERATION and 
MELVYN MEER, 
Charging Parties, 
-and- CASE NO. U-15615 
STATE OF NEW YORK (DEPARTMENT OF 
LABOR), 
Respondent. 
JOHN DILLON, for Public Employees Federation 
MELVYN MEER, ££0 se 
WALTER J. PELLEGRINI, GENERAL COUNSEL (RICHARD W. MCDOWELL 
of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Melvyn Meer-7 
to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing a 
charge that the State of New York (Department of Labor) (State) 
violated §209-a.l(a) and (c) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) by discriminating against Meer and 
terminating him from his position as an ALJ-7 with the State 
Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board (UIAB) for his exercise of 
rights protected by the Act. 
•i'The Public Employees Federation (PEF) is also a charging party 
but it has not filed any exceptions to the ALJ's decision. 
-Peer's official title was unemployment insurance referee, but 
the position is referred to in the record as an ALJ. 
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The ALJ found that Meer had been denied appointment as a 
permanent employee and terminated from his provisional 
appointment because of his poor job performance and not for any 
exercise of protected rights. Meer has filed numerous exceptions 
to the ALJ's decision, arguing that the ALJ committed errors of 
fact and law. The State supports the ALJ's decision. 
After a review of the record and consideration of the 
parties7 arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
Meer was provisionally appointed by the State as an ALJ with 
the UIAB in Brooklyn on May 28, 1991. As with the other ALJs 
appointed at the same time, Meer participated in a three- to 
four-week training program, consisting primarily of lectures on 
the substantive law, evidence, due process and decision writing. 
The ALJs were initially assigned to the UIAB's appeals section. 
There, Meer drafted both long- and short-form decisions for 
issuance by UIAB members on appeals from decisions of the UIAB's 
hearing ALJs. Meer received two performance evaluations while he 
was assigned to the appeals section. Both rated him as 
"effective" and contained positive remarks by his supervising 
ALJ, Margaret O'Brien, as to the thoroughness of his decisions 
and his steady improvement during his first year at the UIAB. 
In late June or early July 1992, Meer and several other ALJs 
were transferred to the UIAB's hearing section. That section 
hears appeals from initial determinations made concerning 
unemployed workers' eligibility for unemployment insurance 
benefits. As a hearing ALJ, Meer conducted several hearings each 
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day of approximately thirty minutes duration each day. The 
hearings were tape recorded and Meer issued a written decision 
after the close of the record. The ALJs received little formal 
training in the conduct of administrative hearings before being 
assigned to a full calendar of cases. 
O'Brien continued as Meer's immediate supervisor.-7 During 
the period from August to September 1992, Meer received six 
memoranda from O'Brien in which she criticized his hearing and 
decision work. On January 12, 1993, Meer received his first 
evaluation of his performance as a hearing ALJ during the period 
May 28, 1992 to November 27, 1992. While his rating remained 
"effective", due in part to his assignment for part of the rating 
period to the appeals section, O'Brien noted that Meer had 
problems in both his manner of conducting hearings and in 
rendering his written decisions. O'Brien did note, however, that 
Meer had shown some improvement after being advised of these 
shortcomings. Meer responded in writing that his mistakes should 
be seen as a reasonable consequence of his training, which was 
one of "error and correction". 
Between March 1 and March 17, 1993, O'Brien met with Meer 
several times about complaints that had been filed with the Chief 
Administrative Law Judge by three litigants who had appeared 
before Meer and had taken issue with his remarks about- their 
representative. On March 17, 1993, Meer received a formal 
ALJ James Bretton initially supervised Meer for two months. 
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counselling memorandum as a result of O'Brien's investigation of 
the litigants' complaints.-7 Meer filed a grievance on 
March 29, 1993, in which he alleged that O'Brien had lied in the 
counselling memorandum, that she was being prosecutorial and that 
any improprieties he had committed were the result of his lack of 
training. 
The grievance was denied at step 1 by Timothy Coughlin, 
executive director of the UIAB, who concluded that the record 
established that Meer had made inappropriate remarks and that, 
therefore, the counselling memorandum was justified. Meer 
appealed the determination to step 2. After a hearing, the 
step 1 determination was upheld in a decision issued June 18, 
1993. O'Brien continued, from March until September 1993, to 
send Meer memoranda in which she noted problems with his conduct 
of hearings and his decisions. Meer received another counselling 
memorandum from O'Brien about his demeanor in September 1993. -.In 
May 1993, Meer was also counselled by another senior ALJ, Ronald 
Moss, who was not his direct supervisor, for remarks he had made 
which indicated to Moss a lack of understanding about the basic 
principles of practice before the UIAB and due process 
-'The memorandum deals with the remarks Meer made about the 
complainants' representative, his handling of an adjournment 
request during one of the proceedings, and his attitude and 
demeanor both at the hearings and during his discussions with 
O'Brien. 
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requirements.-7 Meer filed a grievance on May 6, 1993, in 
response to the memoranda.-7 On June 25, 1993, Coughlin denied 
the grievance at step 1. Coughlin thereafter withdrew the Moss 
counselling memorandum from Meer's file, based upon Meer's 
acknowledgment at the step 2 hearing that he had, in fact, 
received training in due process requirements and as part of the 
settlement of other PEF grievances. 
In September 1993, Meer filed another grievance, alleging 
that Coughlin had assigned him to several travel days to the 
UIAB's offices in Hauppauge, in retaliation for his earlier 
grievances. Thereafter, Meer's grievance and the grievances of 
other hearing AKJs related to travel assignments were withdrawn 
based on Coughlin7s agreement with PEF to conduct another travel 
survey to ascertain travel preferences. The results of the new 
survey were not implemented until February or March 1994.-' 
-'Pursuant to two lawsuits, referred to by the parties as the 
"MLC" lawsuits, filed against the UIAB in the late 1970's, the 
UIAB and the individual ALJs are permanently enjoined to comply 
with minimum due process requirements, as set forth in the 
original lawsuit, relating to the introduction of evidence, 
examination of witnesses, review of initial determinations, 
expeditious hearings and processing of appeals. The terms of the 
MLC lawsuits were the subject of lectures Meer and other new ALJs 
attended as part of their initial training. 
-'Meer filed a grievance on May 7 also, alleging that he needed 
time off to work on his other grievance. That grievance was 
denied at all stages, as confirmed in the step 3 decision issued 
on February 28, 1994. 
^Coughlin testified, and the ALT so found, that the new travel 
schedule was not implemented immediately because the UIAB was in 
the process of making permanent ALJ appointments in the Fall of 
1993 and Coughlin was not sure who of the current ALJs would be 
remaining. 
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Meer's performance evaluation for the period November 1992 
through May 1993 noted that his overall performance had not 
improved and, in some areas, had gotten worse.-7 In November 
1993, a number of ALJs, including Meer, who held provisional 
appointments became eligible for permanent appointment. O'Brien 
and Coughlin discussed Meer's performance, with O'Brien 
recommending that Meer not be retained. On January 11, 1994, 
Coughlin formally advised Meer that he was not being offered a 
permanent appointment and that his last day of work would be 
January 26, 1994. Thereafter, Meer filed a charge with the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging that he was 
being discriminated against because of his age, fifty-five. 
Subsequently, he also filed this improper practice charge. 
Meer's exceptions can be characterized in essentially two 
ways: he excepts to the ALJ's credibility resolutions and he 
alleges errors by the ALJ in making his rulings. After a careful 
review of the record, we find no basis to disturb any of the 
ALJ's credibility resolutions. In several instances, the ALJ 
credits the testimony of Coughlin and O'Brien rather than Meer 
and, Meer's disagreement with these findings notwithstanding, the 
ALJ's resolutions are fully supported by the record. 
The procedural exceptions are numerous and require further 
comment. In his exceptions, Meer alleges that he never received 
-
70'Brien mentioned in Meer's evaluation that he had scored 83% 
in the federal quality appraisal requirements, which was down 
from his last review period in which he had scored 86%. She also 
referred to a problem in dealing with ex parte communications. 
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a performance evaluation for the period May through December 
1993. He further alleges that O'Brien told him in the summer of 
1993 that his work had improved and that his performance 
evaluation would reflect that. The record, however, establishes 
only that O'Brien acknowledged to Meer that his work had 
increased, not improved. While Meer might have expected an 
evaluation in December 1993, in November 1993 Coughlin and 
O'Brien were discussing which of the ALJs would be made permanent 
and which would lose their provisional appointments. As a 
result, no performance evaluations were completed for that 
period. Meer also alleges that he never received any warnings of 
possible termination even though other ALJs had received such 
warnings prior to their termination. O'Brien's stated position 
(which the ALT credited) was not to threaten employees with loss 
of employment in her corrective or counselling memoranda, 
although she did caution them about the possibility of further, 
or more severe, discipline, as she did with Meer. That some 
other senior ALJs did use termination as a threat in counselling 
memos issued to the ALJs under their supervision does not 
establish, as Meer alleges, that he received disparate treatment 
in this regard. His exceptions as to these matters are 
accordingly denied. 
Meer takes exception to the ALJ's handling of PEF's 
requested subpoenas for performance evaluations for the other 
hearing ALJs hired in the spring of 1991 and federal quality 
appraisals of those ALJs for the period of July 1992 through 
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January 1994. He alleges that -the subpoenas were not complied 
with and that the materials presented pursuant to the subpoenas 
were not in the form requested. We need not analyze the 
subpoenas and the documents submitted by the State pursuant 
thereto because, on the record, both Meer and the PEF 
representative agreed that the State had complied with the 
subpoenas.-7 Meer also alleges that the ALT violated an 
agreement, pursuant to this stipulation, that he would not rely 
on Meer's federal quality appraisal scores in reaching his 
decision because, in the rendition of the facts in his decision, 
he refers to the fact that O'Brien listed Meer's federal quality 
appraisal scores in his performance valuation. The ALJ was 
merely reciting the facts and his decision does not rely on 
Meer's scores to support his final determination. 
In his exceptions, Meer also alleges that the ALJ erred in 
failing to consider that the rate of reversals and/or remands of 
his decisions by the UIAB was one of the lowest of the hearing 
ALTs. Meer testified that he had only had two reversals/remands 
during the time he was a hearing ALJ.—7 However, Meer also 
-'Meer alleged that he had been compelled to agree in order to 
avoid further delays in the hearing. While the State did 
indicate that it was considering seeking to quash PEF's subpoenas 
if the modifications it sought were not acceptable to PEF and 
Meer, there is no evidence in the record to support Meer's 
allegation that he was somehow coerced. 
—
7Meer also alleges that the ALJ erred by improperly limiting the 
evidence he sought to introduce in support of this contention. 
However, the only limitation apparent on the record is the ALT's 
action in sustaining an objection as to the relevancy of Meer's 
statement that a senior ALJ told him that one of the reversals 
was, in his opinion, unjustified. 
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testified that there was a significant lapse of time between the 
issuance of an AKJ's decision and the decision of the UIAB on 
appeal. As a result, not many of his cases had been reviewed by 
the UIAB prior to his termination. Furthermore, no comparison is 
made to the reversal/remand rates of the other hearing ALJs. 
The significance of Meer's "low" remand/reversal rate is 
accordingly not established. 
The AKJ's findings as to the number, and relative merit, of 
the grievances filed by the hearing ALJs at the UIAB are excepted 
to by Meer. Any error in this regard is not material, however, 
because the number of grievances, even if many, and whether 
meritorious or not, cannot, in and of itself, establish an 
employer's anti-union animus. 
Meer also excepts to the AKJ's reference to a letter he sent 
to the Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation 
(Director), during the pendency of his hearing, questioning 
PERB's and the AKJ's handling of PEF's subpoena request. Meer 
did not direct the inquiry to the AKJ and he did not copy the 
State or PEF on his letter. The AKJ, in discussing Meer's 
performance evaluations and counselling memoranda in his 
decision, noted that Meer was characterized by O'Brien and Moss 
as having a problem with ex parte communications, which was 
further evidenced, the AKJ found, by his ex parte communication 
with the Director at PERB. We need not decide if Meer's contact 
with the Director was an ex parte communication or whether it 
supported a finding that O'Brien was accurate in her assessment 
of his "difficulties" in this regard. The record evidences that 
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Meer was counselled by O'Brien and Moss for engaging in one-sided 
communications with parties in matters pending before him. These 
communications were of particular concern because of the two MLC 
lawsuits. O'Brien testified that communications by a party to a 
supervising ALT, complaining about a hearing ALT or asking a 
procedural question, were not uncommon at the UIAB, but that the 
hearing ALJs were clearly prohibited from one-sided 
communications with the litigants. The parties focused on only 
one incident, raised by the Moss counselling memorandum, as 
illustrative of Meer's problems, although his difficulties in 
this regard were also mentioned in his second performance 
evaluation as a hearing ALT. The record, without consideration 
of Meer's contact with the Director, amply supports the ALT's 
conclusion that Meer's problem with ex parte communications was 
only one of the several legitimate concerns the State had with 
Meer's performance throughout his tenure as a hearing ALT. 
Finally, Meer's exceptions contain allegations that the ALT 
erred in ruling on certain objections, the admission of evidence 
and the order of questioning by Meer or the PEF representative. 
Meer's exceptions as to these issues either misstate the record, 
take statements out of context or generally misrepresent what 
occurred at the hearing.—7 For those reasons, these exceptions 
are denied. 
—''For example, Meer alleges that the ALT precluded him from 
asking questions when he was one of the charging parties and was 
appearing pro se. However, the record indicates that the parties 
agreed that either Meer or the PEF representative would ask 
questions of each witness and that it was usually Meer who 
questioned the witnesses and made objections. 
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The record amply supports the ALJ's finding that Meer was 
not offered a permanent appointment because he was counselled 
several times on his deficiencies as a hearing AKJ and he had 
failed to correct virtually all of these deficiencies. Indeed, 
many of Meer's performance problems, as identified in the 
counselling memoranda, preceded Meer's first grievance. The ones 
that continued after he began filing grievances simply expanded 
upon the grounds set forth in the initial memoranda: Meer's 
deficiencies in making a record, in making rulings, in issuing 
decisions and in maintaining an appropriate judicial demeanor 
toward the litigants. Thus, the timing of events supports the 
conclusion that the protected activity of filing grievances 
followed and resulted from Meer's performance problems rather 
than causing them, as Meer contends. 
Further, there is no evidence of any union animus on the 
part of O'Brien or Coughlin. The counselling Meer received, his 
evaluations and the disposition of his grievances provide no 
basis to conclude that O'Brien or Coughlin were improperly 
motivated. There is nothing in the record that establishes that 
Meer's grievances were atypical or particularly controversial and 
they provide no basis by themselves upon which to conclude that 
O'Brien or Coughlin harbored any ill will toward Meer because of 
them. Additionally, other ALJs who had received counselling 
memoranda (although in smaller number) and who had filed 
grievances in response have been made permanent. 
For the reasons set forth above, Meer's exceptions are 
denied and the decision of the AKJ is affirmed. 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: June 19, 1996 
Albany, New York 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions and cross-exceptions-' 
filed, respectively, by the Cortland Paid Fire Fighters 
Association, Local 2737, IAFF, AFL-CIO (Local) and the City of 
Cortland (City) to a decision by the Assistant Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation (Assistant Director) in a 
scope of negotiation dispute. The City charged that the Local 
violated §209-a.2(b) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act 
(Act) by submitting nonmandatory subjects of negotiation to 
compulsory interest arbitration pursuant to §209.4 of the Act. 
^Those portions of the Local's appeal papers which are 
denominated as its response to the City's response to the Local's 
exceptions have not been considered. The response to the City's 
response was not requested or authorized pursuant to §204.11 of 
our Rules of Procedure. 
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The Local excepts to the Assistant Director's determination 
that its proposal 4 is nonmandatory. The City excepts to the 
Assistant Director's determination that the Local's proposals 5, 
9, the first and second paragraphs of 16, 17B and 17E are 
mandatory subjects of negotiation. 
LOCAL'S EXCEPTIONS 
PROPOSAL 4 
Due Process for Bargaining Unit employees, - In 
handling day-to-day operations of the Fire Department, 
the Chief may determine it is necessary to inquire of 
bargaining unit employees information necessary to 
provide proper instruction and/or guidance in their 
fulfilling firefighting/code enforcement duties and 
responsibilities. The purpose of such an inquiry is not 
disciplinary in nature but rather to allow, among other 
things, casual resolution of job issues. Such inquiries 
are to be encouraged and bargaining unit employees are 
to participate in these. However, to the extent these 
inquiries give raise [sic] to discipline or otherwise 
effect [sic] the employment of the bargaining unit 
employees, the "due process" requirements currently 
existing in the contract shall be triggered. Such due 
process rights shall include, but not be limited to (1) 
the bargaining unit employee being paid straight time 
when ordered to discuss an incident with the Chief 
during off hours; (2) the bargaining unit employee 
shall be informed immediately of the nature of the 
investigation before questioning commences and 
sufficient information shall be provided to the 
employee at the commencement of the questioning to 
reasonably appraise [sic] the employee of the facts and 
circumstances involved in the incident; and (3) the 
[Local] shall be advised sufficiently in advance of the 
questioning to allow its representative to be present. 
The Assistant Director held this proposal to be nonmandatory 
because he considered that its first three sentences did not 
address any terms and conditions of employment. Finding that 
part of the proposal to be prefatory in nature, and one not 
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severable from the rest of the demand, he held the entire demand 
nonmandatory. 
The Local argues in its exceptions that the first part of 
its demand does not relate to nonmandatory subjects of 
negotiation, but, if so, it is severable from the rest of the 
proposal, such that it should not be considered a unitary demand. 
The Assistant Director properly treated proposal 4 as a 
unitary demand. The language after the first three sentences 
incorporates by reference those first sentences such that the 
proposal cannot be reasonably comprehended without its 
introduction. The negotiability of the proposal, therefore, must 
be assessed according to the proposal as submitted. In that 
regard, the Local argues alternatively that the first three 
sentences of this demand, like the rest of it, cover mandatory 
subjects of negotiation, not the City's mission. 
For precisely the reason that proposal 4 is a unitary 
demand, the first three sentences can only be considered in the 
context of the entire demand. When read in that relevant 
context, we find the first three sentences to be as mandatorily 
negotiable as the rest of the demand of which they are an 
inseparable part. 
The demands which have been found nonmandatory as prefatory 
are those which did not seek to settle some aspect of a term and 
condition of employment. Rather, they reflected general 
affirmations of mutual responsibility intruding upon matters 
beyond the employment relationship such as service to the 
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community-' or the quality of education.-7 Moreover, in each of 
the cited cases involving prefatory demands, the prefatory 
language was in the form of a general preamble to the collective 
bargaining agreement. 
Proposal 4 is a demand regarding the due process rights of 
unit employees when undergoing employment-related questioning by 
their employer which is either for the express purpose of 
disciplinary action or when that questioning could lead to 
disciplinary action. Each of the first three sentences is 
directly related and gives meaning to that term and condition of 
employment as they simply clarify when the due process rights 
thereafter set forth do not attach. By defining or exemplifying 
a type of questioning which is not for a disciplinary purpose, 
each sentence individually, and all collectively, settle an 
aspect of employer-employee communication. We hold proposal 4 to 
be a mandatory subject of negotiation. 
CITY'S EXCEPTIONS 
PROPOSAL 5 
The City shall provide legal counsel for the defense of a 
member of the [Local], at no expense to the member against 
whom a complaint, charge or claim is filed, arising out of 
an incident in the line of duty within the Cortland Fire 
Department and/or Code Enforcement Office, except for 
internal discipline of a bargaining unit employee. 
-'Schenectady Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n, 21 PERB f3022 (1988). 
^Onondaga Community College Fed'n of Teachers, 11 PERB f3 045 
(1978); Orange County Community College and County of Orange, 
9 PERB J[3068 (1976) . 
Board - U-16843 -5 
The Assistant Director held this demand mandatory on the 
basis of our decision in Albany Police Officers Union, Local 
4821,-7 in which the same type of demand was held mandatorily 
negotiable. 
The City claims that this demand is nonmandatory because 
defense/indemnification in criminal proceedings goes beyond the 
employment relationship even though the proceeding arises from a 
line-of-duty incident. But so too can an employer's defense/ 
indemnification of an employee in a civil proceeding stemming 
from a line-of-duty incident, a demand which the City admits is 
mandatorily negotiable. These types of demands are mandatorily 
negotiable because they are essentially ones for compensation/ 
legal insurance. By the negotiation of such demands, employees 
seek insulation from financial liability stemming from 
proceedings instituted against them for actions taken in the line 
of duty. The Local's demand being a form of employment-related 
compensation, and there being no public policy or other 
prohibition against the negotiation of such a proposal, it is a 
mandatory subject of negotiation. 
PROPOSAL 9 
Verbal Orders Being Reduced to Writing - The parties 
tentatively agreed upon reducing to writing all 
administrative verbal orders within 96 hours to written 
form. The orders shall have the proper authorized 
signatures and shall be posted for a period of not less 
than 30 days for bargaining unit employees' review and 
education. All general and special orders shall follow 
the same criteria. 
16 PERB 53068 (1983). 
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The Assistant Director held that this proposal merely 
specified the form for work rules and that it did not prohibit the 
issuance of any such rules. 
The City argues that the demand cannot be restricted to work 
rules, with or without disciplinary sanction, although so limited 
by the Local in its brief to the Assistant Director, because it 
covers by its terms "all" verbal orders, including general and 
special orders. 
In Rochester Fire Fighters, Local 1071,-7 a broader demand 
was held mandatory on the ground that the form of an order issued 
to an employee, regardless of the substance of that order, relates 
to potential discipline. The rationale was that employees are 
entitled to negotiate for a written confirmation of any orders 
given them because noncompliance with an order can lead to 
discipline. We affirm the Assistant Director's determination that 
because proposal 9 does not prohibit or restrict the issuance of 
any orders, it is a mandatory subject of negotiation, even if it 
is not as limited as the Assistant Director interpreted it to be. 
PROPOSAL NO. 16 
Job Openings/Posting Vacancies - When an opening/ 
vacancy exists within the City of Cortland Fire 
Department/Code Enforcement Office, The Fire Chief shall 
post an opening/vacancy notice on the [Local] Bulletin 
Board at least 30 days prior to filling said vacancy. 
Further the City shall be required to maintain an 
eligibility list of candidates for hiring and/or 
promotional opportunities for all bargaining unit 
positions of the Cortland Fire Department/Code 
5/12 PERB H3 047 (1979) . 
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Enforcement Office. As a minimum testing shall be held 
in accordance with the periodically published testing 
schedules within the New York State Civil Service Law. 
The Assistant Director held the first paragraph of this 
demand to be mandatory because the posting procedures do not 
"unduly delay" the City from filling vacancies. He held the 
second paragraph mandatory as a demand relating to procedures, 
not position qualifications. Responding to the City's 
alternative argument, the Assistant Director held that the second 
paragraph of the demand did not simply reiterate existing 
statutory requirements. 
The City argues that the first paragraph of this proposal 
requires it to wait thirty days before filling any vacancy and 
this waiting period interferes with its right to carry out its 
responsibility to operate an effective fire department. 
The job posting proposal in the first paragraph of this 
demand is not simply a procedural notice provision. The demand 
prevents the City from filling any job vacancy in the fire 
department by any means for any reason' for a period of thirty 
days. We find this demand to be nonmandatory even if it is read 
to apply only to unit positions. 
Although we have indicated that job posting proposals can be 
mandatorily negotiable,-x nothing in any of our decisions 
suggests that all job posting demands are in that category of 
^Schenectady Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n, supra. In that case, 
however, we did not have a specific job posting proposal for 
review. 
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negotiability. Demands requiring the filling of vacancies are 
nonmandatory because they prevent an employer from exercising its 
managerial prerogatives regarding staffing levels.z/ We see no 
material difference between demands which require the filling of 
a vacancy and ones which prevent the filling of a vacancy under 
all circumstances without exception for a defined period of time. 
Both prevent an employer from implementing a staffing decision. 
An employer's decision to increase staffing is a managerial 
prerogative to the same extent and for the same reasons the 
decision to decrease staffing by not filling vacancies is not 
mandatorily negotiable. Both relate to and affect an employer's 
level of service to the public. 
Without deciding whether a more narrowly drawn job posting 
proposal would be mandatorily negotiable, we hold that this one 
is overly broad in that it applies to all positions under all 
circumstances without articulated exception for a period of time 
arguably sufficient to interfere with staffing determinations 
necessary to public safety and departmental operations. We find 
it, therefore, to be a nonmandatory subject of negotiation. 
The Assistant Director held the second paragraph of 
proposal 16 mandatory upon the conclusion that the required 
maintenance of a civil service eligibility list concerns only 
hiring/promotional procedures, not qualifications. The City 
disputes this conclusion. It argues that the proposal restricts 
Z/Scarsdale Police Benevolent Ass'n, Inc., 8 PERB f3 075 (1975); 
City of Albany, 7 PERB f3079 (1974). 
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its clear managerial right to determine hiring and promotional 
criteria and qualifications because it requires the City to test 
prior to hiring or promoting without exception. 
We need not decide whether the Local's demand is reasonably 
susceptible to the interpretation given it by the City because we 
find it to be nonmandatory for a different reason. It is 
axiomatic that a duty to bargain is premised upon and presupposes 
employer power over the subject sought to be bargained. When 
that power resides exclusively in another entity which is beyond 
the employer's control, there can be no legal duty to bargain. 
The City as employer has no control over the creation or 
continuing maintenance of civil service lists or the scheduling 
of civil service examinations. Those are matters within the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the appropriate civil service 
commission acting pursuant to requirements of the Civil Service 
Law.-7 Whether the demand is characterized as procedural or 
substantive is immaterial because the City does not control the 
subject matter of the demand no matter its characterization. 
PROPOSAL NO. 17B 
Temporary assignment of Code certified firefighters to the 
Code Enforcement Office will be on a 30 calendar day 
rotating bases [sic], using the Fire department seniority 
system, (lowest to highest in seniority). 
The Assistant Director held this demand mandatory. He 
determined that the reference to "code certified" meant and 
g/Citv of Rochester, 12 PERB 53010 (1979) (demand within the 
jurisdiction of the civil service commission nonmandatory). 
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ensured that the employees had all been determined to be 
qualified for assignment to the Code Enforcement Office. 
Therefore, the assignment of such qualified personnel by 
seniority was mandatorily negotiable. 
The City argues that the demand is nonmandatory because it 
makes seniority the sole criterion for a job assignment, thereby 
depriving it of any right to determine qualifications for the 
assignment. We disagree with this argument. If the code 
certification process is given any meaning at all, all persons 
possessing the certification must be deemed to possess all of the 
qualifications necessary for code enforcement. Assignment by 
seniority, therefore, does not divest the City of any right to 
fix job qualifications. 
The City argues alternatively that this demand is 
nonmandatory because it interferes with the City's right to 
assign code enforcement work to fire fighters. The demand, 
however, does not prevent the City from assigning such work to 
fire fighters. To the contrary, it contemplates that such work 
will be assigned to fire fighters. The demand would merely 
determine which of several qualified fire fighters will be 
assigned the work for a period of time. The City's right to 
assign duties inherent to a position to the incumbents of that 
position does not exempt it from a duty to negotiate the 
distribution of that work among the several qualified incumbents 
in the manner proposed by the Local. 
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PROPOSAL NO. 17D 
All bargaining unit employees assigned to the Code 
Enforcement Office shall be off duty on the following 
holidays. Bargaining unit employees shall receive one 
additional day off, of the employee's choice. 
New Years Day Labor Day 
Columbus Day Martin Luther King Day 
Memorial Day Independence Day 
Christmas Day Lincoln's Birthday 
Washington's Birthday Veteran's Day 
Thanksgiving Day 
The City argues that the Assistant Director's holding that 
this demand for holiday leave is mandatory, "strips the City of 
its ability to provide code enforcement services" on those days. 
According to the City, the demand is nonmandatory because it 
prevents it from being able to provide a service on those days. 
The subject matter of the demand is paid time off from work, 
clearly and admittedly a mandatory subject of negotiation. 
However, this particular demand is nonmandatory because it 
arguably prevents service delivery on designated days. The 
record does not disclose whether only unit employees staff the 
Code Enforcement Office. From the unexplained face of this 
demand and demand 16, it appears that the Code Enforcement Office 
is staffed at least primarily, if not exclusively, by unit 
employees. The employees in that office are the ones who are 
responsible for the delivery of code enforcement services. This 
demand makes all of those persons unavailable to the City should 
it elect to provide code enforcement services on a holiday 
because it specifically requires them to be "off duty". To this 
extent, this broadly worded leave proposal, which leaves the City 
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without apparent means to staff for delivery of service on given 
days, is not different from other types of time off proposals 
held to be nonmandatory as an interference with an employer's 
right to fix staffing levels.^ 
For the reasons set forth above, the Assistant Director's 
decision is reversed regarding the Local's proposals numbered 4, 
16 and 17D and otherwise affirmed. The Assistant Director's 
order requiring the Local to withdraw proposal 4 from arbitration 
is rescinded; the dismissal of the charge entered as to proposals 
16 and 17D is reversed and the Local is hereby ordered to 
withdraw proposals 16 and 17D from arbitration; in all other 
respects, the Assistant Director's order is affirmed. 
DATED: June 19, 1996 
Albany, New York 
PaiiLirre R. yKinsella, Chairperson 
Eric J. Schmertz, Member/ 
g/Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n of Newburcrh, New York, Inc.
 r 
18 PERB J[3065 (1985) (employees selected personal days off) ; Citv 
of Yonkers, 10 PERB f3 056 (1977) (number of employees on vacation 
at any given time). 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SCHALMONT TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, NYSUT, 
APT, APL-CIO, LOCAL 4856, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-16784 
SCHALMONT CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
KEVIN BERRY, for Charging Party 
HANCOCK & ESTABROOK, LLP (JOHN F. CORCORAN of counsel), for 
Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Schalmont 
Teachers Association, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO, Local 4856 
(Association) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALT) 
dismissing its charge that the Schalmont Central School District 
(District) had violated §209-a.l(d) of the Public Employees7 Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when it denied a request by the 
Association's president and vice-president to attend the annual 
New York State United Teachers Lobby Day, thereby changing 
unilaterally a long-standing past practice. 
At both the beginning of the hearing before the ALT and at 
the close of the Association'*s case, the District moved to 
dismiss the charge for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, 
alleging that the charge involved only a contractual dispute. 
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The AKJ reserved decision on the motions. The District thereupon 
rested without calling any witnesses. The ALT denied the 
District's motions in his decision, finding that the parties' 
collective bargaining agreement did not cover the matter in 
dispute and that, in any event, the agreement had expired at the 
time the action which forms the basis of charge was taken. 
Nevertheless, the AKT dismissed the charge, finding no change in 
any past practice. 
The Association excepts to the AKT's findings in defining 
the parties7 practice, while the District supports the AKT's 
decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and consideration of the 
parties' arguments, we affirm the decision of the AKT. 
The Association established that, at least for ten years, 
its president, Michael Foley, had requested permission to attend 
the Lobby Day in Albany and that the District superintendent had 
approved the request.-'' Foley's absence while at Lobby Day was 
not charged to any of his accrued leave time. In 1995, Foley 
once again requested permission to attend Lobby Day. His request 
was approved by his building principal but was denied by the 
acting superintendent.-1 Foley, rather than utilize any of his 
personal leave time, did not attend Lobby Day and instead 
reported to work. 
-'Foley testified that he had been accompanied to Lobby Day by 
Jean Duxbury, the vice-president of the Association. 
-
7Duxbury's request was also denied. 
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To establish the alleged §209-a.l(d) violation, the 
Association has the burden of establishing an unequivocal 
practice with respect to that mandatory subject, that had existed 
for a substantial period of time and that had reasonably been 
expected by unit employees to continue unchanged.-7 Union leave 
time is a mandatory subject of negotiation.-7 However, the 
unequivocal practice asserted by the Association is not the 
practice as established by the record evidence. The Association 
claimed that the practice was an unrestricted right to attend 
Lobby Day. However, the practice, as defined by the 
Association's only witness, Foley, was that for over ten years he 
requested permission to attend Lobby Day and that the 
superintendent, exercising his unrestricted right to do so, 
granted his request. Foley did not merely notify the 
superintendent of the date of Lobby Day and advise him that he 
would be attending, he requested permission to attend. The 
practice, therefore, is permission to attend Lobby Day with 
approval, not an entitlement to attend simply upon notice; and 
that practice has not changed. Foley requested permission to 
attend Lobby Day. The acting superintendent exercised his 
discretion to deny Foley's request and there is nothing in the 
record to show that the exercise of that discretion was 
restricted, conditioned or waived. Although the superintendent 
^County of Nassau, 24 PERB f3029 (1991). 
^Local 2561, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 23 PERB [^3054 (1990) . 
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for many years gave his permission for Foley to attend Lobby Day, 
this did not by itself create a practice entitling Foley to the 
day unconditionally or divest the superintendent of his right to 
exercise his discretion each time such a request was made.-7 
Based on the foregoing, the Association's exceptions are 
denied and the decision of the AKT is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: June 19, 199 6 
Albany, New York 
^Public Employees Fed'n v. PERB, 195 A.D.2d 930, 26 PERB 57 008 
(3d Dep't 1993). 
STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SHERIFF OFFICERS ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-16618 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, NASSAU 
LOCAL 830 and COUNTY OF NASSAU, 
Respondents. 
LYNCH & TOSCANO, P.C. (THOMAS A. TOSCANO of counsel), for 
Charging Party 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (JEROME LEFKOWITZ Of 
counsel), for Respondent CSEA 
BEE, EISMAN & READY (HOWARD B. COHEN of counsel) for 
Respondent County of Nassau 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Sheriff 
Officers Association, Inc. (SOA) to a decision by an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on a charge it filed against the 
Civil Service Employees Association, Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Nassau Local 83 0 (CSEA) and the County of Nassau (County). SOA 
alleges that CSEA violated §209-a.2(a) of the Public Employees' 
Fair Employment Act (Act) and that the County violated 
§209-a.l(a) and (b) of the Act when they continued negotiations 
regarding revisions to a memorandum of agreement (MOA) after they 
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knew that SOA had filed a representation petition by which it 
sought to replace CSEA as the bargaining agent for a substantial 
portion of the Sheriff's department employees who are currently 
in CSEA's unit. 
The ALJ dismissed the charge without a hearing pursuant to 
CSEA's and the County's motions. The ALJ held that CSEA and the 
County had the right to continue negotiations regarding the MOA 
because the MOA constituted a contract bar to SOA's petition, all 
of the conditions stated in the MOA, including "approval" by the 
County Executive, having been satisfied before the SOA's petition 
was filed.-7 Accordingly, SOA's petition did not and could not 
raise a bona fide guestion concerning representation (QCR). The 
ALJ concluded, therefore, that CSEA and the County were entitled 
to undertake negotiations regarding questions arising under the 
terms of the MOA. 
SOA argues in its exceptions that the ALJ erred in 
concluding that the MOA barred its petition because the MOA was 
not signed and it was not approved by the County Executive 
pursuant to the requirements of local law. As the MOA did not 
bar its petition, CSEA and the County violated the Act by 
continuing their negotiations after they knew that the 
representation petition had been filed. SOA argues further that 
-
/The representation petition was filed with the Nassau County 
mini-PERB. By split decision issued in late May 1996, the mini-
PERB dismissed the petition as untimely on the ground that the 
MOA barred SOA's subsequently filed petition. 
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at the very least there are questions of fact raised in its offer 
of proof sufficient to preclude dismissal of its charge on 
motion. 
CSEA and the County each argue that the AKT's decision is 
correct. They claim that the County Executive did sign and 
approve the MOA through agents authorized under the Act and local 
law. Therefore, the ALJ properly held that the MOA barred the 
petition. 
For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the AKT's 
dismissal of the charge. 
The following facts are not in dispute and they form the 
basis for our affirmance of the ALJ's decision. CSEA and the 
County reached the MOA on June 30, 1994. The MOA was signed by 
Anthony Russo, the County's Commissioner of Labor and its 
Director of Labor Relations, and Peter A. Bee, the County's 
Special Labor Counsel. Several persons signed on behalf of CSEA, 
including the Local's president, CSEA's assigned collective 
bargaining specialist, and members of CSEA's negotiating team. 
The last paragraph of the MOA subjects the MOA to ratification 
and/or approval as follows: 
It is expressly understood that the foregoing is 
subject, in all respects, to approval by the CSEA 
negotiating committee, ratification by the CSEA 
membership, approval by the County Executive and 
ratification by the Nassau County Board of Supervisors. 
It is admitted that CSEA approved and ratified the MOA in 
July 1994. It is further admitted that the County Board of 
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Supervisors ratified the MOA by resolution on August 1, 1994. 
SOA's petition was not filed until January 19, 1995. 
The ALJ correctly recognized that the disposition of this 
charge hinges upon whether SOA's petition raised a bona fide QCR. 
This is an issue clearly related to but distinct from the 
question of whether SOA's petition was "timely" under the rules 
of the Nassau County mini-PERB.^7 Therefore, no question is 
presented here as to whether we are bound by a mini-PERB's 
finding of fact or conclusion of law made during the processing 
of a case within its jurisdiction. 
If SOA's petition raised a bona fide QCR, as we have defined 
it, then CSEA and the County were thereafter barred from 
negotiating.-7 If the petition did not raise a bona fide QCR, 
then CSEA and the County, as parties to an unchallengeable 
bargaining relationship, were free to exercise their bargaining 
rights and to fulfill their bargaining obligations. 
SOA argues that its representation petition raised a bona 
fide QCR because the MOA did not bar that petition. Two reasons 
-
7A hypothetical variation of the facts will illustrate the 
distinction. The mini-PERB might possibly have held the petition 
timely under its own substantially equivalent contract bar 
principles. However, applying our own contract bar principles in 
the disposition of the improper practice charge, we could still 
dismiss the charge on the ground that the petition did not raise 
a bona fide QCR. 
-
70ur dismissal of the charge makes it unnecessary for us to 
decide whether CSEA and the County were engaged in the type of 
negotiations our case law is intended to prohibit, absent consent 
of all affected parties, after a bona fide QCR has been raised. 
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are advanced in support of that theory: that the County 
Executive did not sign the MOA and that he did not approve it 
prior to the date the representation petition was filed. 
As to SOA's first reason, although our decisions require a 
contract to be signed by both union and employer if it is to 
constitute a bar to a petition, nothing in any of those decisions 
holds or suggests that the document asserted to constitute the 
bar must bear the signature of either the union's or the 
employer's chief executive officer. Both parties can and often 
do negotiate through designated agents who are empowered and 
required upon demand to sign the agreement negotiated on behalf 
of their principal. Russo's and Bee's signatures on the MOA on 
behalf of the County fully satisfied the signature requirement of 
our contract bar rule. Any provision of local law requiring the 
signature of the County Executive himself as a condition to the 
existence, validity or enforceability of any form of collective 
bargaining agreement would be fundamentally inconsistent with 
controlling provisions of the Act. Those provisions of local 
law, to that extent, would be invalid and State law would 
control.-f Therefore, even if local law required the MOA to be 
signed personally by the County Executive, or by a deputy 
specifically designated for the purpose, that would not serve to 
negate the bar to the petition raised under the Act by the MOA. 
^Doyle v. City of Troy, 51 A.D.2d 845, 9 PERB fl7510 (3d Dep't 
1976). 
Board - U-16618 6 
As to the second ground, SOA argues that the signature of 
Robert L. Olden, the Deputy County Executive, at the end of the 
legislative resolution approving the MOA merely served to put the 
resolution into effect pursuant to and as required by §107 of the 
County charter.-7 SOA steadfastly maintains, however, that 
Olden's signature putting the legislative resolution into effect 
merely satisfied the condition stated in the MOA regarding 
legislative ratification and that his signature did not and could 
not satisfy the separate requirement stated in the MOA that the 
County Executive approve the MOA. We hold for the reasons set 
forth below that the condition regarding the County Executive's 
approval of the MOA was either satisfied apart from Olden's 
approval of the legislative resolution or it was waived. 
The MOA is completely silent regarding the form of the 
County Executive's required approval. As the terms of the MOA 
control the approval, it must be concluded that the parties 
intended and understood that the approval did not have to be 
manifested in any specific way or by any overt act, such as the 
County Executive's signature on the MOA. Even assuming Olden7s 
signature upon the legislative body's resolution was for the 
-'That section requires the County Executive to approve all 
ordinances or resolutions, other than those relating to 
procedure, before those legislative actions can take effect. It 
is admitted by all parties that the Deputy County Executive has 
been properly empowered to approve resolutions on behalf of the 
County Executive under §2 05 of the County Charter. 
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limited purpose asserted by the SOA,-7 the very submission of an 
agreement to a legislative body for its ratification presupposes 
as a matter of law that the agreement satisfies all stated 
conditions which a public employer must meet. In Jamesville-
Dewitt Central School District,^ we held that legislative 
ratification of an agreement can occur only after negotiations' 
have ended and the representatives of the chief executive officer 
have reached an agreement with their union counterparts. The 
County's legislative body could not have conducted a ratification 
of the MOA consistent with the requirements of Jamesville-Dewitt 
unless the County Executive had previously approved it. 
Moreover, as a matter of practical inquiry, if the County 
Executive had not earlier approved the MOA, then what was before 
the legislative body for its ratification? The SOA does not 
offer an answer to this question. It is clear to us that the 
Board of Supervisors had to be ratifying an agreement between 
CSEA and the County Executive. Were we to accept SOA's argument 
that the County Executive had not approved the MOA by the date of 
the Board of Supervisors' resolution, we would have to conclude 
that the legislative body engaged in both a meaningless and a 
legally ineffective act, one which was then immediately approved 
by the County Executive's own deputy. We find nothing in SOA's 
-''we do not, therefore, express any opinion as to whether Olden 
did approve the MOA on behalf of the County Executive or whether 
he had the power to do so under local law. 
Z/22 PERB ^3048 (1982) . 
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offer of proof or anywhere in the record to warrant such a 
conclusion. 
Even were we to accept SOA's argument that the County 
Executive's affirmative approval of the MOA was not granted prior 
to the date its petition was filed, that condition was waived by 
the County Executive as a matter of law. 
The approval condition placed in the MOA reserved to the 
County Executive a right to disapprove the MOA even though the 
MOA had been entered into on his behalf by his designated agents. 
The County Executive would not have had the right to disapprove 
the MOA had it not been for this specific reservation of right 
under mutual agreement. That right of disapproval, however, had 
to be exercised within a reasonable period of time or not at all. 
Otherwise, the County Executive would hold a perpetual veto over 
implementation of the terms of the MOA. 
The MOA was legislatively approved on August 1, 1994, 
having been approved and ratified earlier by CSEA. There is 
no allegation that at any time between August 1, 1994, and 
January 19, 1995, when SOA's petition was filed, the County 
Executive or any of his agents did or said anything to disapprove 
the MOA or to disassociate themselves from its terms. Indeed, 
SOA itself acknowledges that the County implemented at least some 
of the terms of the MOA as of January 1, 1995, before the 
representation petition was filed. 
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In summary, the County Executive's approval of the MOA was 
either granted or that condition was waived before SOA filed its 
petition. As the MOA satisfies all elements of our contract bar 
doctrine, the petition SOA filed with the mini-PERB did not raise 
a bona fide QCR. Therefore, that petition did not require CSEA 
or the County to cease any negotiations regarding the MOA or any 
question arising thereunder. 
For the reasons set forth above, SOA's exceptions are denied 
and the AU's decision is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: June 19, 1996 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO,, 
Petitioner, 
- and - CASE NO. C-4422 
TOWN OF PENFIELD, 
Employer. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (MIGUEL ORTIZ of counsel), 
for Petitioner 
BERNARD WINTERMAN, for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On May 23, 1995, the Civil Service Employees Association, 
Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (petitioner) filed, in 
accordance with the Rules of Procedure of the Public Employment 
Relations Board, a timely petition seeking certification as the 
exclusive representative of certain employees of the Town of 
Penfield (employer). 
Thereafter, the parties executed a consent agreement in 
which they stipulated that the following negotiating unit was 
appropriate: Included: Clerk III with Typing, Clerk II with 
Typing, Account Clerk with Typing, 
Senior Account Clerk, Assistant 
Recreation Director, Senior Recreation 
Supervisor, Recreation Supervisor, 
Assistant Assessor, Real Property 
Appraiser, Real Property Appraiser 
Trainee, Program Analyst, Cable TV 
Coordinator, Fire Marshall. Building 
Inspector, Assistant Building Inspector, 
Assistant Building/Code Compliance 
Inspector, Administrative Assistant, 
Telephone Operator, Graphic Information 
System Operator, Court Clerk, Deputy 
. Town Clerk/Receiver of Taxes, Town 
Historian (P.T.), Payroll Clerk (P.T.), 
Local History Room Coordinator (P.T.), 
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Secretary Planning/Zoning (P.T.), 
Assistant Fire Marshall (P.T.), Clerk 
III with Typing (P.T.) and Account Clerk 
with Typing (P.T.). 
Excluded: Assessor, Recreation Director, Director 
of Finance, Director of Public Works, 
Superintendent of Sewer Maintenance, 
Director of Planning, Zoning & Building 
Services, Director of Parks & 
Facilities, Town Clerk/Receiver of 
Taxes, Deputy Director of Planning, 
Zoning & Building Services, Deputy 
Director of Public Works, Junior 
Engineer, Building Inspector Aide, Youth 
Referral Counselor, Recreation Leader, 
Receptionist, and all other employees. 
Pursuant to that agreement, a secret-ballot election was 
held on April 24, 1996, at which a majority of ballots were cast 
against representation by the petitioner.-7 
Inasmuch as the results of the election indicate that a 
majority of the eligible voters in the unit who cast ballots do 
not desire to be represented for the purpose of collective 
bargaining by the petitioner, IT IS ORDERED that the petition 
should be, and it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: June 19, 1996 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
1/ Objections to the election, which were filed on May 1, were 
withdrawn by the petitioner on May 24. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 264, INTERNATIONAL 
BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4511 
TOWN OF ROYALTON, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Teamsters Local 264, 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters has been designated and 
selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public 
employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of 
consctivc negotiations anu tj.j.e settlement oi grievances. 
Unit: Included: All full-time and regular part-time employees 
in the water/sewer and highway departments. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
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FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Teamsters Local 264, 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters. The duty to negotiate 
collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith, with respect to- wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of 
an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the 
execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement 
reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not 
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making 
of a concession. 
DATED: June 19, 1996 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella, CKairperson 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION 
LOCAL 424, A DIVISION OF UNITED INDUSTRY 
WORKERS DISTRICT COUNCIL 424, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4500 
ONEIDA-HERKIMER-MADISON BOCES, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Public Service 
Employees Union Local 424, A Division of United Industry Workers 
District Council 424 has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: Account Clerk-Typist, Account Clerk, Audio 
Visual Clerk, Audio Visual Aide, Audio Visual 
Rspsir Technician Automotive Mechanic 
Building Maintenance Worker, Cleaner, Clerk, 
Clerk Typist, Courier, Custodian, Data 
Processing Control Clerk, Graphics Aide, 
Groundsperson, Groundsman/Maintenance, Heavy 
Equipment Operator, Laborer, Library Assistant, 
Mechanic, Micro Film Operator, Micro 
Computer/AV Equipment Repair Tech, Micro 
Computer Operator, Motor Vehicle Operator, 
Offset Duplicating Machine Operator, Photo 
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Typesetting Machine Operator, Printing Aide, 
Printing Assistant, Program Assistant, Public 
Information/Public Relations Assistant, Science 
Center Aide, Secretary to the Dean of Students, 
Senior Clerk, Senior Typist, Senior 
Stenographer, Senior Account Clerk, 
Stenographer, Storekeeper, Telephone Operator, 
Typist, Word Processing Equipment Operator. 
Excluded: All other employees, including, but not limited 
to Confidential Secretary to the 
Superintendent, Confidential Secretary to the 
Assistant Superintendent for Administrative 
Services, Confidential Secretary to the 
Assistant Superintendent for Instruction, 
Confidential Secretary to the Director of 
Personnel/Human Resources, Senior Account 
Clerk/Treasurer, Senior Typist/Certification 
Liaison, Human Resources Clerk, and Senior 
Account Clerk/Budget-COSERS. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the United Public Service 
Employees Union Local 424, A Division of United Industry Workers 
District Council 424. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution 
of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a 
concession. 
DATED: June 19, 1996 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
